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MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT (AND HIS OPPONENTS):  
IDEOLOGY STILL COUNTS 
David A. Strauss 
The impressive article by Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, Kevin Quinn, 
and Jeffrey Segal tells us something illuminating about the behavior of Su-
preme Court Justices.1  But I do not believe that the article tells us what it 
seems to tell us.  Professor Epstein and her co-authors seem to say that Jus-
tices routinely change their views, so that a President should not be too 
concerned about the ideology of prospective appointees, and the people 
who might oppose those appointees should not be too concerned, either.  As 
Professor Farnsworth demonstrates in his excellent commentary,2 the Ep-
stein et al. paper does not justify such a conclusion, and the authors’ explicit 
claim is more modest than the tone of the article perhaps suggests.  
In any event, I do not think that the Epstein et al. paper refutes, or—
again contrary perhaps to appearances—even purports to refute the most 
plausible version of the “conventional wisdom” that the authors say they are 
challenging.  I actually think the conventional wisdom is much closer to the 
view that Epstein et al. embrace—that Justices are systematically unpredict-
able—than it is to the view they reject.  But whatever the conventional wis-
dom is, the most accurate account is more complex than either “they all 
change” or “they never change.”  
I think the best description is this:  When a President has an agenda—
when he appoints a Justice because he wants to influence the way the Court 
will decide a specific issue, or set of related issues—the President is hardly 
ever disappointed.  Many of the Justices who supposedly disappointed the 
President who put them on the Court were not appointed primarily because 
of their views; they were appointed to pay off a political debt, or for elec-
toral reasons of the kind Epstein et al. mention.3  But other examples of Jus-
tices who “changed” involve something more interesting.  These are 
instances in which the Justices’ opinions did not change in any discernable 
 
1  Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Im-
portant?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).  For a preview of that article, see Lee Epstein et al., 
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices:  Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 127 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/8/ (link). 
2  Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, 
with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/11/ (link). 
3  See Epstein et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 17–18, 43–44, on file with Colloquy). 
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way, but new issues emerged—issues on which the Justices’ previous views 
were not known, or in any event did not play a role in the President’s deci-
sion to appoint them.  
When this happens, Justices may change in the sense that Justices who 
were expected to be “conservative” will cast “liberal” votes in some cases, 
and vice versa.  But the conclusion that Epstein et al. suggest—that Presi-
dents should not pay much attention to ideology in appointing Justices4—
does not follow.  On the contrary:  Presidents who have an ideological 
agenda almost always get what they want on the issues they care about.  
In the last hundred years, the President with the clearest agenda for the 
Supreme Court—Franklin Roosevelt—also, as it happens, made the most 
appointments, and Roosevelt’s appointees illustrate how Presidents with an 
agenda will not be disappointed even if their nominees do “drift.”  The ba-
sic story is well known.  In Roosevelt’s first term as President, the Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional some of the central features of Roosevelt’s 
New Deal.5  No one left the Court in Roosevelt’s first term, and after Roo-
sevelt won by a landslide in 1936, he proposed legislation that would have 
allowed him to appoint additional justices, thereby assuring a majority in 
favor of his legislative program.  The so-called Court packing legislation 
was not enacted, but soon there were vacancies on the Court, and by the end 
of his long tenure in office Roosevelt had named eight new Justices.6  
Two of Roosevelt’s earliest appointments were Hugo Black and Felix 
Frankfurter.  Both were dyed-in-the-wool supporters of the New Deal and 
relentless critics of the Court that struck down Roosevelt’s legislation.  But 
Black and Frankfurter became adversaries in one of the central constitu-
tional controversies of the mid-twentieth century, the extent to which the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, particularly those having to do with crimi-
nal procedure, should apply to the states.7  Black and Frankfurter also dis-
agreed over the scope of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech,8 
and over such issues as whether the Constitution required states to reappor-
tion their legislatures.9  The general view—affirmed by Professor Epstein 
 
4  See id. (manuscript at 58–59, on file with Colloquy). 
5  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (link) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (link) (in-
validating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad 
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (link) (invalidating Railroad Retirement Act of 1934).  
6  The story of the Court-packing fight is told in many places; a standard account is WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995).  
7  See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (link); id. at 
68 (Black, J., dissenting). 
8  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (link); id. 
at 579 (Black, J., dissenting). 
9  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187 (1962) (Black, J., joining in the majority) (link); id. at 266 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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and her co-authors10—is that Frankfurter became more “conservative” 
while Black remained “liberal” (before turning “conservative” later in his 
career, after Frankfurter had left the Court). And in a sense that is true:  in 
the criminal procedure cases, the First Amendment cases, the reapportion-
ment cases, and others, Black took positions that were generally regarded as 
liberal, and Frankfurter disagreed.  
Roosevelt’s appointees diverged in a similar way on the single most 
important question of mid-twentieth century constitutional law—the consti-
tutionality of state-imposed racial segregation.  Black was unequivocal in 
his support for the decision the Court eventually reached in Brown v. Board 
of Education.11  Frankfurter and Robert Jackson (Roosevelt’s Solicitor Gen-
eral and Attorney General, whom he appointed to the Court in 1941) were 
more hesitant, for institutional reasons; they were not sure the Court, as op-
posed to Congress (in Jackson’s view, at least) could or should be the insti-
tution to end segregation.12  Stanley Reed—Roosevelt’s second appointee to 
the Court, after Black—was the most reluctant of the Justices to join the 
Brown opinion.13  James Byrnes, who was also appointed to the Court by 
Roosevelt in 1941 but resigned a year later (to become a close aide to Roo-
sevelt in the White House), was the Governor of South Carolina in 1954—
and a defender of segregation.14  
In a recognizable sense, then, Roosevelt’s appointees moved all over 
the place ideologically, just as Epstein and her colleagues suggest.  Does 
this mean that it was pointless for Roosevelt, or his opponents, to have con-
cerned themselves with the views of his nominees?  Not at all.  Roosevelt’s 
agenda concerned federal power over the national economy.  On issues re-
lating to his agenda, he got exactly what he wanted.  None of his appointees 
ever cast a vote for limiting federal power over the economy.  That issue—
an intensely controversial one in the first third of the twentieth century—
became totally settled in favor of Roosevelt’s position in a strikingly short 
time.15  Roosevelt had an agenda for the Court, made appointments accord-
ingly, and his agenda prevailed unequivocally.  Over the course of their ca-
 
10  See supra note 1 (manuscript at 30–32, on file with Colloquy). 
11  347 U.S. 483 (1954) (link). On Black’s views, see, for example, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE 594–98 (1975).  
12  See KLUGER, supra note 11, at 599–611. 
13  See id. at 598.  
14  See id. at 333, 335.  
15  Compare the cases cited in note 5, decided before any Roosevelt appointments, with cases de-
cided after Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the Justices:  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 
(1941) (link) (unanimously upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act and overruling Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (link), which had invalidated the Child Labor Act); and Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (link) (unanimously upholding Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause to enact the Agricultural Adjustment Act, even as applied to home-consumed wheat).  On the 
evolution of the law during this period, and the influence of the Roosevelt appointees, see BARRY 
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 208–24 (1998).  
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reers, the Roosevelt appointees did diverge; but they diverged on issues that 
were not salient at the time of their appointment and that were not of pri-
mary importance to the President.  
This pattern repeated itself, later in the twentieth century, with Richard 
Nixon.  In the 1968 Presidential campaign, Nixon criticized the Supreme 
Court for decisions that, he said, were unduly favorable to criminal defen-
dants.16  Nixon also signaled sympathy for Southerners who objected to the 
pace of desegregation.17  Nixon made four appointments early in his ad-
ministration, and the direction of the Court shifted on both of these issues.  
The Court became much less aggressive about desegregation and undertook 
no new initiatives to protect criminal defendants’ rights.18  But the most 
controversial issue of the next generation turned out to be neither criminal 
justice nor race—it was abortion.  Three of Nixon’s appointees voted in fa-
vor of reproductive rights in Roe v. Wade.19  A Kennedy appointee, Byron 
White, dissented.  The intellectual foundations of Roe were laid by Justice 
John Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman20—and Harlan had been 
the most “conservative” Justice on the Warren Court in the 1960s.  
Again, there was, in a sense, rampant ideological drift—from right to 
left for three Nixon appointees, from left to right for White.  (Harlan went 
from being a conservative force to a liberal avatar without doing anything!).  
But again the lesson is not that Justices’ views should not matter to the 
President or to the President’s opponents.  It is that sometimes issues 
change in ways that scramble previous political alignments.  On abortion, 
the Nixon “conservatives” voted with the “liberals” Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall, and the Kennedy “liberal,” White, voted with the conservative 
Rehnquist.  This supposed shift will be reflected in the Martin-Quinn scores 
(if I understand that method correctly), and might be perceived by Court-
watchers.  But the real shift was in what issues became prominent.  Nixon 
got what he wanted on the issues he cared most about.  
Once in a while, of course, Justices who are appointed because of their 
views on particular issues will cast votes on those issues that disappoint the 
President who chose them.  Justice Harry Blackmun is a dramatic example, 
wonderfully described in Linda Greenhouse’s biography.21  But, pace Ep-
stein et al., instances of genuine change of that kind are, I believe, rare.  
Other Justices whom Epstein et al. discuss, such as Sandra Day O’Connor 
and Anthony Kennedy, were not the product of President Reagan’s agenda:  
 
16  See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS:  THE UNITED STATES, 1975–1974 701–02 
(1996). 
17  Id. 
18  See id. at 732–34. 
19  410 U.S. 113 (1973) (link) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell were nomi-
nated by Nixon). 
20  367 U.S. 497, 539–55 (1961) (link). 
21  LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY (2005). 
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O’Connor was appointed, of course, because she was a woman,22 and Ken-
nedy was chosen in part because he would be acceptable to a Senate that 
was controlled by Democrats and that had just rejected an “agenda” nomi-
nee, Robert Bork.23  It is not at all surprising that O’Connor and Kennedy 
adopted positions that were somewhat different from the Reagan admini-
stration’s policy preferences.  
President George W. Bush’s two appointees, John Roberts and Samuel 
Alito, were, according to published accounts, chosen after a careful and 
highly ideological search.24  There is no reason at all to expect that they will 
disagree with the views of the Bush Administration on the issues that matter 
to that administration—abortion, gay rights, affirmative action, criminal 
justice, and government aid to religion.  This does not mean that neither 
will ever cast a vote that could be called “liberal.”  On issues that were not 
central to the administration that appointed them—issues like, perhaps, fed-
eralism, freedom of speech, or the scope of the Free Exercise Clause—they 
may (or may not) cast such votes.  To the extent those issues become 
prominent, the Martin-Quinn index might register what Epstein et al. call 
ideological change or drift.  But that will not mean that President Bush and 
the members of his administration wasted their time and political capital in 
securing the appointments of Roberts and Alito.  
Presidents, like the rest of us, cannot always foresee what issues will 
become important in the future; even if they could, they might not know 
what position they would take on those issues themselves.  More to the 
point, a President is likely to care much more about getting the decisions he 
wants from the Supreme Court on the issues he is engaged with than he is 
about decisions on questions that might arise after he has left office.  And 
Presidents, as well as the people who work for them, are likely to be good 
at knowing who their friends are on the issues of the day.  If a President has 
the desire and the ability to appoint to the Court people who agree with him 
on the issues he cares most about, he is likely to get what he wants from the 
Court on those issues.  Whatever we are to make of the Martin-Quinn 
scores, they do not disprove the lesson of at least seventy years’ experience: 
if  a President has strong views about how the Supreme Court should rule 
on some set of issues, there is every reason for that President, and his politi-
cal opponents, to concern themselves with prospective Justices’ ideology. 
 
22  MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:  THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (2005) (asserting that “O’Connor understood that she had been appointed be-
cause she was a woman, not because of her stellar academic credentials and reputation among those who 
knew her”). 
23  Id. at 173–74. 
24  See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 188–89, 313-14 (2007). 
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